In April the Howard League released a report on prison labour entitled ’Business Behind Bars’. The report it turned out was the League’s contribution to what appears to have started out as a joint collaborative project [1] with Policy Exchange, one ostensibly "exploring the implementation of real work in prison". However, the Howard League report received almost no media coverage unlike the following month's release of Policy Exchange’s ’Inside Job’ report, which was given the full treatment courtesy of the think tank’s PR department, resulting in a deal of press, TV and blogosphere attention. [2] Whilst marshalling many of the same and not particularly novel arguments in defending their respective corners, liberal prison reformers vs. right wing pro-business ideologues, the most interesting and revealing elements of this two-pronged assault on the lack of ’real work’ in prisons are, once one has gotten over some of the bizarre errors in the Policy Exchange document that appear to betray a woeful ignorance of the prison system, together with the often contradictory and incoherent arguments put forward by both organisations, the two very different agendas these reports pursue.
On The Same Page
One of the cornerstones of the Tory-led ’Rehabilitation Revolution’ is the notion that prisons should be required to "become places of hard work and industry" and that all prisoners ultimately should work a 40 hour week. Policy Exchange (PE) and the Howard League (HL), to their credit, obviously realised that trying to establish the latter principle was a total non-starter in such a monolithic organisation as the Prison Service. Instead they have based their proposals on what they see are much more realistic projections for possible ’real work in prison’ schemes and, initially using the ideas set out in ’Breaking the Cycle: Effective Punishment, Rehabilitation and Sentencing of Offenders’ [3] together with HL’s experiences of trying to run the Barbed design studio in HMP Coldingley, it is unsurprising that both organisations have come up with the same set of core proposals:
● Category C training prisons as the most suitable institutions to house ’real work’ schemes;
● prisoners serving sentences of 4 or more years best suited for ’real work’ schemes (though PE appear to be somewhat confused over this issue as they stipulate "at least two years remaining to serve on a sentence", obviously meaning within ’to serve in prison’ [see Box 4]);
● prisoners should be free from drugs, including those on maintenance regimes, and have sufficient literacy and numeracy (reading age 11+ according to PE);
● the private companies using in-prison labour should be able to chose the prisoners they employ (HL see this interview process as being the process by which those not fulfilling the previous criteria should be weeded out but PE suggest that the Prison Service should do the weeding via suggested new Category W and Worker IEP levels [see below];
● these companies should directly employ the prisoner via a contract; prisoners should pay tax and N.I. as well as requiring prisoners to donate a proportion of their wages to a victim’s fund as a condition of their employment (both organisations resort to this sophistic use of language - "[t]his individual deduction from earnings for victims, accepted as a condition of employment, represents a form of restorative justice as individuals are making reparations themselves rather than through compulsion" [Inside Job, p.59] and "[t]his better represents restorative justice, as individuals are making reparations themselves rather than through compulsion" [Business Behind Bars, p.37]);
● government plans to introduce the Prisoners’ Earnings Act 1996 are unnecessary (though PE insist on calling it the Prisoner Earnings Act for some reason);
● ’real work’ schemes should not be allowed to affect the local economy through unfair competition i.e. undercutting local business or coming into direct competition to the local labour market;
● government should use ’real work’ schemes to help repatriate previously offshored jobs (PE bizarrely see such schemes as being beneficial in that "[d]epending on the level of prison wages" (i.e. if they are low enough) previously offshored jobs might be repatriated and that "[p]rison labour offers a potential alternative to offshoring that is less harmful to the local community and is not direct competition to the local labour market"!? Interestingly, HL uses this as an argument in favour of higher and ’fair wages’ for prisoners. [see Box 1]);
● individual prison governors should be free to tout for business and negotiate contracts;
● the introduction of ’real work’ schemes requires the operation of dynamic security processes (though PE do not explicitly use this terminology) and the need for more flexible staffing patterns, with changes being made to restrictive regulations like Bulletin 8 [prison officers’ shift patterns], extending the Core Week [the amount of time prisoners are supposed to spend in activities] and doing away with the 2 hour lunch time bang up; and
● there needs to be a greater transparency about the companies using prison labour and the contracts negotiated.
A Divergence Of Opinion
Nothing too surprising or that controversial there then, especially given their mandate? Yet even within these areas of apparently common agreement we can see some subtle (and not so subtle) points of disagreement that clearly stem from their differing ideological, polemical and experiential standpoints. [4] For example, the Howard League, having a wider knowledge of the prison system as well as being in regular contact with inmates, is the more prisoner-friendly of the two organisations and argues that prisoners must "receive a fair wage for work undertaken or the rate for the job [HL, p.34] i.e. at or above the National Minimum Wage (even though, under the 1998 Act, a prisoner "does not qualify for the national minimum wage in respect of any work which he does in pursuance of prison rules") and be entitled to normal protection under employment legislation. Indeed, BBB goes further and states that "[l]ower and punitive rates of pay, while encouraging businesses to engage in real work in prison, will disincentivise work for prisoners and serve only to exploit." [HL, p.35]
Compare that to Policy Exchange's stance. Firstly, they are much less informed about prisons [Box 2 & 4] and display the standard tabloid-led cynicism towards prisoners in general, pursuing the same tired old saw about TVs, games consoles and gym equipment. [5] In fact, their whole approach to the needs of the respective participants in this enterprise can be summed up in the following quote: "At the heart of real work in prison are free market principles, in which the laws of supply and demand take precedence." [PE, p.38] Thus prisoners and their labour value are a mere commodity to be traded between prison governors and private companies and central to the model proposed in IJ is a new fifth prisons category, Category W, and a new matching higher ’super Enhanced’ or ’Worker’ IEP level. To be eligible to join this new elite, a prisoner would have to be drug-free, including being on any maintenance/drug substitution regimes [see Box 2], "having sufficient education to follow and understand instructions (reading age 11+) and be available for the foreseeable future" [PE, p.30] i.e. at least 2 years left to serve in prison. Unlike the proposal in BBB to initially operate from 2 Category C training prisons, with a possible expansion to the 9 remaining Category C training prisons, employing some of the 12,500 plus eligible long-term prisoners, [6] PE outlines the possibility of using up to 24% (17,000) of the sentenced prison population, expanding into the Category B estate and converting other prisons to Category C (Category W) status.
NMW vs. PMW
And what will any prisoners that have managed to jump through the requisite hoops and gained entrance into this elite cadre be paid? Well, PE proposes a new national wage rate, something it calls the Prison Minimum Wage (PMW), [7] which will be "less than the National Minimum Wage because it reflects the reduced living costs of those in prison" [PE, p.9] - a sort of reverse London weighting, except this form of financial inducement is obviously aimed not at the worker, making the prospect of taking a job more enticing, but at the employer, making the prospect of moving jobs into prisons much more enticing i.e. more profitable. So, having whittled away notional housing, food and transport costs (based on ONS Family Spending data) from the NMW, PE comes up with a figure of £3.10 per hour for this new PMW. But they don’t stop there, they also suggest that after tax and N.I., prisoners’ wages should be split equally between a ’management fee’ (paid to the prison), a victims’ fund ’donation’ or tax, payment into a ’resettlement fund’ and the remaining 25% would be the ’take home’ pay - which would work out to a princely sum of 70p, less than all other current prison jobs pay!
As further evidence of the authors' low regard for prisoners in general, and for potential Cat W workers in particular, IJ (unlike BBB) makes no reference whatsoever to the potential employment rights of these prisoners and it appears that the authors feel that Category W prisoners should be granted no such rights; after all "real work is ... a privilege". Indeed, the authors view the introduction of ’real work’ and the PMW "provides an opportunity to recalibrate and reform the IEPS so that it might achieve something more than rewarding bare compliance with rules", [PE, p.50] one that will miraculously "encourages more engagement and compliance" via competition amongst prisoners to attain the "privileged opportunity" of joining this new ’workers’ elite and one that will ultimately "transform prison regimes". Given the historically intractable problems endemic within the prison system, we recommend that they don’t hold their breath too long on this one.
Errors And Omissions
Although both of these reports were largely written before the arrival of the government's latest contribution to the 'Rehabilitation Revolution' ‘Making Prisons Work: Skills For Rehabilitation’, it is still surprising that neither addresses the central issue examined in that document: education and training provision. Given that ‘Making Prisons Work' highlights the fact that "[t]he skills and training available through offender learning will be crucial to enabling the difficult challenge of making an economic success of work in prisons" and that both HL and PE documents emphasise the paucity of the skills-base within the prisoner population, this omission is all the more confusing. True, PE does claim that "over time, driven by the use of payment-by-results and a clear focus on the thresholds for real work, improved outcomes from education and drug treatment inside prisons are possible and ... establishments must reform the commissioning and provision of healthcare and education to ensure that programmes paid for by the taxpayer are cost-effective" [PE, p.33] and that "management fee income would also serve as an incentive ... encouraging the provision of more effective and focused education and drug programmes" [PE, p.52], yet that hardly amounts to concrete policy suggestions of the sort needed to transform the prison skills base.
Box 1: COMPARE & CONTRAST
Work in Prison:
"Statistics from the prison industries unit illustrate that over 100 firms ... contract through NOMS to engage prisoners in work... To demonstrate how effective the prison labour force can be, over the past two years NOMS has made £6.5 million from the contracts agreed with private clients." [HL, p.11] [i]
"Evidence from the prisons industries unit within NOMS demonstrates that a great deal of work already takes place within prisons." [HL, p.13]
"There are over 300 workshops employing around 10,000 prisoners each week day..." [HL, p.19]
"While NOMS contracts with more than 200 firms ... and earned £6.5 million over 18 months from these contracts, the workshops that exist are believed to be currently operating at only 50% capacity." [PE, p.7] [i]
"Only 24,000 work places exist within a prison estate holding 85,000 inmates." [PE, p.6]
"[A]t present, only around 1 in 10 prisoners undertake some sort of work while they are in prison." [PE, p.17]
"It is also clear that prison work is a relatively small proportion of purposeful activity." [PE, p.20] [see Box 2]
"[N]o inmate is compelled to work and most do not... [T]he present system neither rewards those who do engage appropriately, nor penalises those who disrupt or fail to engage." [PE, p.27]
"Life in prison is not currently conducive to work. There is an embedded culture in prison regimes of not working, of simply ‘doing time’ and of purposeful activity being optional. There is often an expectation that work is not worth doing, resulting in prisoners remaining in cells." [PE, p.40]
Year |
Industries Sales [a] |
Contract Services Sales [b] |
00-01 |
10.55 |
– |
01-02 |
11.6 |
– |
02-03 |
10.1 |
– |
03-04 |
11 |
– |
04-05 |
– [c] |
– |
05-06 |
0.8 [c] |
– |
06-07 |
7.8 |
– |
07-08 |
7.1 |
6.1 |
08-09 |
– |
4.9 [d] |
09-10 |
– |
4.2 |
Pay:
"[I]t is essential that prisoners receive a fair wage and prisons enterprises are therefore not in a position to undercut industry outside the prison walls." [HL, p.13]
"Prisoner specific pay that is substantially lower than a fair rate for the job presents significant dangers. Lower and punitive rates of pay, while encouraging businesses to engage in real work in prison, will disincentivise work for prisoners and serve only to exploit... Further, from a market point of view, any wage that is significantly lower than the market rate for the job will harm local businesses within the community and could mean job losses for local people." [HL, p.35]
"It is recommended that within Category C training prisons where real work is taking place prisoners should be allowed to spend an increased amount on their personal comfort within prison. It would potentially allow the purchase of colour TVs, better bedding and higher education." [HL, p.39]
"It is important that real work in prison does not turn into exploitation." [PE, p.9]
"Prisoners must also be paid fairly for the work they undertake because real employment requires a realistic and equitable wage." [PE, p.9]
"IEPS should be reformed so that it operates properly as a reward and not an entitlement." [PE, p.13]
"Potential New Worker IEPS level... Private cash allowance £25". [PE, p.49] (i.e. the same as currently allowed for Enhanced level IEP prisoners.)
"Allowing work in prison to turn into exploitation would erode confidence in the criminal justice system and create divisive and unstable regimes. The best possible safeguard is therefore to develop a prison minimum wage that reflects the reduced living costs of those in prison, while still providing a labour cost incentive for employers without amounting to exploitation." [PE, p.52]
Reasons to Use Prison Labour:
"Employing prisoners creates numerous ways for companies to make financial savings ... likely to be engaged in relatively low-skilled work and consequently some minimal pay savings could be made when compared with the community. ...reductions in capital expenditure ... use pre-existing prison infrastructure will reduce or eliminate a significant proportion of the usual capital expenditure normally incurred at the onset of a new business venture ... prison buildings and workshops could be used rather than renting other premises outside the prison walls." [HL, p.12]
"The opportunity of real work in prison is significant: for prisoners to earn respect, money and support on release; for prison governors to bring commercial activity into their prisons and reduce reoffending; for victims to feel more properly respected and compensated for the crimes against them and for businesses to benefit from the profitability of an untapped resource." [PE, p.11] Real work in prison is about business being able to access the prison labour market and determine for itself what sort of work, with which offenders, will generate business benefits." [PE, p.35]
Other Incentives:
"Government should consider the incentives for businesses who wish to operate within a prison." [HL, p.11] (as though access to captive cheap non-unionised workforce that one doesn’t have to pay holiday or sick pay to is not enough of an incentive!)
"[R]eal work presents an opportunity to improve conditions for prison staff in such prisons... arm[ing] prison governors and prison staff with more appropriate incentives and sanctions." [HL, p.24]
"The risk of a prisoner having their reputation tainted in the eyes of not just the prison authorities but their potential future employer provides substantial disincentive to prisoners not to engage in offending behaviour while in prison." [HL, p.25]
"Escaping the monotony of prison life and working for a body that does not represent the institution of incarceration provides a strong and clear incentive for prisoners to fully engage in real work." [HL, p.34]
"The current average pay for prison service work undertaken by prisoners is £9.60 per week. Such an amount is derisory and provides little incentive to work." [HL, p.35] [see Box 4]
"[A]rtificial arrangements (i.e. incentives for businesses who wish to operate within a prison) are not compatible with the principles of real work and would be likely to have a negative broader impact on business." [PE, p.39]
"The expansion of real work also provides an opportunity to supplement and recalibrate the Incentives and Earned Privileges scheme." [PE, p.10]
"A distinct cohort – Category W – could then enable better population management by concentrating the available workforce in a small number of establishments while providing serving prisoners with a clear incentive and a grade to aspire to that would bring additional opportunities and rewards (such as more in-cell privileges and prison visits)." [PE, p.12]
"Real work provides an opportunity to improve the security and stability of the regime." [PE, p.50]
"Under the real work in prison model, the prison establishment, specifically the prison governor, would have a clear and meaningful incentive to engage with external businesses. The possibility of generating [an] income for discretionary spend would provide significant opportunities to improve the prison in any way the governor decided." [PE, p.51]
"The difference between the PMW and the NMW ensures that there is an incentive for businesses to consider prison labour and to offset many of the costs associated with dealing with the public sector and prisons in particular. The lower wage also ensures that those with the lowest skill levels are not priced out of the market." [PE, p.52] |
Box 2: DID WE REALLY SAY THAT?
"Prison governors already work to veto business proposals that involve paying prisoners exploitatively low wages." [HL, p.35]
"[N]o inmate is compelled to work." [PE, p.14] Yet on the following page we find: "Real work in prisons in the twenty-first century should not be a requirement but a privilege." [PE, p.15] Surely some contradiction here? [see Box 4]
"Wages [in prison] are offered with no link to performance." [PE, p.27] Obviously PE did not research prison work deeply enough as most of the assembly and packing jobs (two-thirds by value of all Contract Service income [see HL, Fig. 2] and probably 85%+ of Contract Service jobs) are paid on a piece rate basis.
"Although a sizeable minority of the public appear to endorse the notion of unpaid labour for prisoners, enforced labour in custody that is not paid is illegal (under Article 4 of the European Convention on Human Rights)" [PE, p.19] This is patently not true. In fact Article 4 legitimises forced labour in prison and makes absolutely no reference to payment.
"It is also clear that prison work is a relatively small proportion of purposeful activity." [PE, p.20] Yet Figure 6 shows that work represents 50% or more of purposeful activity in 46% of all prisons. Hardly "a relatively small proportion".
"[P]rerequisites for a prisoner applying for work... can be summarised as requiring the prisoner to be a relatively low security risk (Category C and IEP Enhanced), being free of drugs (as determined by testing regimes)..." [PE, pp.29-30] This again appears to show a lack of understanding of prison procedures as all prisoners are subject to Mandatory Drug Testing and failure of any test would certainly result in the loss of Enhanced status. Additionally, IEP Enhanced prisoners are required to sign up for Voluntary Drug Testing as part of their IEP compact. What they mean, and this is only made clear in Table 4 [p.30], is that prisoners should not be on any drug maintenance regime e.g. on methadone or Subutex scripts.
"Concentrating Category W prisoners in establishments where real work opportunities exist, where appropriate, can ensure that security risks elsewhere in the estate are minimised" [PE, p.41] - This is a telling comment as, having already acknowledged that "[w]orking prisoners are those who pose the least security risk", it appears to further acknowledged that the introduction of ’real work’ into select parts of the prison estate will both concentrate less compliant prisoners in the system and introduce further inequalities into it leading to a likely increase in tensions, especially amongst those denied Category W status.
In discussing the local job market, ’Inside Job’ makes the statement: "Businesses do not, for the most part, wish to court controversy... [by using] prison labour where it would either directly result in job substitution or be perceived as such by the public." [PE, p.38] This may well be the case, as it is generally true about any publicity surrounding the use of prison labour, but a desire not to "wish to court controversy" has hardly prevented some of the same companies offshoring the self same businesses that PE argue should be return to the UK via the use of prison labour. [see the discussion on HL and Dyson]
It should also be noted that prison officers’ uniforms are currently sourced form the Chinese Laogai prison labour system. In fact, screws’ uniforms have been made by outside contractors for decades since prolonged complaints about the poor quality production of their previous suppliers - UK prison workshops.
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HL are even more remiss on this front, with the only mention of training being needed as that by governors "on how to tender for business and how best to foster an appealing atmosphere for real work within prison" [HL, p.6] However, the Howard League's most glaring omission is their wholesale abandonment of the social enterprise model that they pioneered in Barbed graphic design studio at HMP Coldingley. If "Barbed was enormously successful in ... pioneering a new form of prison employment", [8] why has the organisation abandoned this "path-breaking initiative [that] transformed individual lives and ways of thinking about prison work" in favour of more of the same sort of "uninspired, repetitive and poorly paid ... prison work that characterises modern incarceration", even assuming a NMW wage packet at the end of the week? Instead it has accepted that full-on capitalist exploitation, abandoning "the opportunity [for prisoners] to work productively and collectively to establish camaraderie based on mutual goals and end products" of such a co-operative enterprise for the 9 to 5 drudgery of the factory floor. But, as the BBB conclusion makes clear in its first lines: "Real work in prison is not charitable. It is not a project and it is not training. It is real work that creates wealth and makes a profit." [HL, p.41]
Where Did It All Go Wrong?
In addition to these often glaring omissions, there are some very strange and often basic errors, not least in the inexact use of terms by the IJ authors resulting in unnecessary confusion. [see the relevant Boxes] For example, the authors try to establish their credentials with the following straw man: "The total number of work places, approximately 24,000, is considerably higher than the frequently cited figure of 9,000 work places. This is because the 9,000 figure only covers those work places servicing the internal market or external contractors. The remainder of jobs are primarily jobs maintaining and servicing the prison (e.g. cleaning and catering work)", [PE, p.19] having already committed the same error themselves earlier on: "prison work places were 17% in 1995, fell to 13% in 2003 and have dropped to 11% today", [PE, p.6] (meaning "prison workshop place"). Other howlers include being unable to get the mane of HMP Lowdham Grange correct, even though the authors visited the prison, via inanities such as "the vast majority of prison work currently taking place is not real work in the sense that it is full-time, properly paid, and contract-based", [PE, p.18] [9] and the plainly stupid: "with most inmates working just 12 hours per week in non-commercial jobs that involve no payback to society" [10] all the way to the core solecistic argument, that "[e]mploying prisoners creates numerous ways for companies to make financial savings" such as minimal pay savings, reductions in capital expenditure, "using pre-existing prison infrastructure [to] reduce or eliminate a significant proportion of the usual capital expenditure normally incurred at the onset of a new business venture", etc., [HL, p.12] whilst at the same time arguing that "it is essential that prisoners receive a fair wage and prisons enterprises are therefore not in a position to undercut industry outside the prison walls." [HL, p.12] Both organisations are guilty of this self-deluding rationalisation of their positions, though the PE document clearly posits undercutting current external wage levels to a greater extent.
Clearly there is a tightrope here that the Prison Service will have to walk if it is not to end up merely offering private companies a much more profitable alternative to pursuing their businesses outside of the prison walls as has been intimated in the case of companies like Speedy Hire. [11] Other structural problem offering significant stumbling blocks to the introduction of ’real work’ into the prison environment include the changes that would need to be made to restrictive regulations such as Bulletin 8, extending the Core Week and doing away with the standard 2 hour prison lunchtime bang up so prison officers can eat their pot noodles and do the odd Sudoku puzzle after the prisoners have had their meal. However, there is one standout problem that neither organisation, despite their supposed extensive knowledge of prisons, and that is visiting times. Both make reference to ’visitation rights’ and the need for a set of minimum standards for them, amongst other things, and PE suggests that Category W prisoners should have the earned privilege of more visits, but neither organisation mentions when these visits would occur. Currently, prison visiting times are in the vast majority of cases during daytime working hours, with a few exceptions allowing early evening visits a few days a week. This is for two very practical reasons: 1) financial - the majority of prison officers work during daylight hours and it is therefore cheaper to have visits when they are around to search and supervise visitors; and 2) the vast majority of prison visitors have to travel large distance to get to often out of the way prisons that are poorly served by public transport, often accompanied by children, and therefore have to do so during the daytime. Therefore, unless a prisoner is willing to only exercise their visitation rights at the weekend, they will have to forgo the chance of ’real work’ as employers are not going to want workers who are constantly pulling a ’visitie’.
However, there is one outstanding issue however that both organisation appear to be totally blind: what happens to all the work currently carried out in the Category C estate workshops that the introduction of all these new exterior commercial contracts will displace? The smooth functioning of the prison estate relies on all the products for internal consumption, everything from boxer shorts and socks to cell doors and security gates via cell furniture, bedding and work wear; not to mention the financial stability of NOMS. [12] Where will all this work go? Certainly not to outside companies as that would prove prohibitive expensive and certainly not to other prisons as the workshops currently do not exist, even in mothballed form, and would again prove prohibitive expensive. Obviously they could continue to be carried out on the same production lines as those being transferred to use by private companies but this would almost certainly prove to be to disruptive and would definitely restrict the commercial viability of the whole business of introducing outside jobs into the prison environment. This appears to be a fundamental stumbling block to any plan for ’real work’ in prisons and, short of building new workshops to house all this ’real work’, which again would be prohibitive expensive, to which there appears to be no viable solution.
It’s The Market Stupid
So, what are we left with? We have a plan that appears to be based solely upon the idea of creating an elite of prison workers that can be hired out to the highest bidder, and whilst it is suggested that it would benefit the prisoners inducted into the Category W cadre, giving them experience of this hyped-up notion of ’real work’ and lip-service is even paid to the idea of in-prison employers taking on prisoners when released, much of the ’supporting evidence’ appear to be mere wIndow dressing for this core notion. This plan is based squarely on the notion that ’The Market’ remains the solution to everything, to the State's inability to run the functions that it is trusted with such as health provision and public security, including our prisons, (the only two areas that the Coalition have specifically excluded for 'marketisation' in forthcoming public sector competition legislation) and that it offers a solution both to the problems of financing the prison system and to the stratospheric reoffending rates amongst ex-prisoners (completely ignoring the fact that ’The Market’ creates the very social inequality that drives people into most forms of criminal activity in the first place c.f. the drugs economy and its pool of willing consumers, unemployed mothers driven to shoplifting to feed and clothe their children - the list is endless). "At the heart of real work in prison are free market principles, in which the laws of supply and demand take precedence" the ’Inside Job’ authors claim. Given that, just exactly how do they think ’The Market’ will be prevented from exploiting a patently subsidised employment opportunity, one that will clearly undercut existing external markets, and stop firms from transferring extant jobs into the prison environment to the loss of the current workforce? And pity the poor con who does decide to join the Category W cadre, having to work for two masters, both with divergent sets of needs that will inevitable be drawn into conflict, with the poor prisoner tugged in opposite directions and having to work out which side of his bread is the better butter is on - all for 70p an hour if Policy Exchange get their way (not that the deduction of the Howard League's victim tax from a NMW-based pay packet is anything to write home about).
In the end one is left wondering why, given that Policy Exchange have attempt to paint such an appalling picture of lazy drug-addled and generally feckless prisoners sleeping all day, except when they are either watching TV, playing video games or using the latest state of the art gym equipment, they are even bothering to try and engage with the idea of using prison labour at all.
References:
Prison |
Internal Consumption |
Contract Services |
Channings Wood |
wardrobes, cell & education furniture, jeans, laundry |
assembly & packing |
Coldingley |
steel shelving, security products, laundry |
engineering prods., laundry, signs |
Everthorpe |
– |
dtp, recycling, assembly & packing, woodwork assembly |
Featherstone |
security gates, sheet metal prods., tubular chairs & tables., work wear, cutting for interlock industry |
engineering prods., assembly & packing |
Haverigg |
face cloths, sheets, pillowslips, bed covers, mop heads, sewing machine repairs, etc. |
laundry, assembly & packing, recycling, woodworking |
Maidstone |
printing, finishing, typesetting, design, binding, jeans, shorts |
laundry, textiles, printing, assembly & packing |
The Mount |
cell doors, security products, aluminium windows & doors |
assembly & packing |
Risley |
boxer shorts, pillowslips, teacloths |
assembly & packing, recycling |
The Verne |
garden furniture, wardrobes, cupboards, cell tables, lockers |
assembly & packing, woodworking |
Wayland |
boiler suits, bed covers, work wear jackets |
assembly & packing |
Wellingborough |
– |
assembly & packing |
Box 3: A FEW SLIGHTLY DUBIOUS EXAMPLES
One of the BBB recommendations is that "the Ministry of Justice should work with the Department for Business Innovation and Skills to explore the issue of repatriating business back to Britain", going on to give the example of Dyson "which moved large swathes of production to Malaysia in 2002". However, what HL fail to mention is that in the two years prior to the move abroad one of Dyson’s sub contractors [McKechnie] had, no doubt trying to cut costs, transferred part of its production to HMP Full Sutton and used prisoners to assemble vacuum cleaner parts. Strange that.
PE present a rather rosy picture of the current state of work in prison, cherry-picking largely from the private prison estate and from that rarest of beasts flagship purpose built public sector industrial prisons such as HMP Coldingley [i]and Muret in France. For example, practice at PFI prisons such as HMPs Altcourse, Dovegate and Wolds, all built with the past 20 years and run by private companies are given prominence whilst HMP Wellingborough, probably the most disfunctional [ii] of current public sector prisons, is used as an (unnamed) example of the "embedded culture in prison regimes of not working" and public sector prisons in general.
The aforementioned Muret prison with its assembly of Airbus parts, along with HMP Dovegate in the UK, are given as shining examples of "prison workshops ... contracted by external businesses ... to complete assembling and other low-skilled manufacturing work", as is Unicor, the Federal Prison Industries sector in the United States. Unfortunately, these latter exemplars are somewhat small exceptions to the rule - whilst Muret is the largest jail in France for long-term prisoners, it still only hold 638 inmates and most other French prisons have similar employment profiles to their English counterparts. Unicor is another case in point, with Federal prisons holding less than 10% of the total US prison population and Unicor only employing 9% of that Federal prison pop i.e. 0.7% of all US prisoners (whereas 4.7% of prisoners in England and Wales are employed in Contract Service workshops) and the pay rate of 14-78p per hour is less than their UK counterparts even though they can work 6 days a week, up to 10 hours a day, with some prisoners (those in Unicor call centres) working a 24 hour shift pattern. A lot of the US’s military equipment is made by Unicor too, everything from webbing, helmets and bulletproof vests all the way up to circuit boards for Patriot missiles and even parts for some of the munitions recently dropped on Libya, as well as carrying out the refitting and maintenance of many of the military vehicles used in Iraq and Afghanistan. In fact, the only omission appears to be the exclusion by PE of the most prominent worldwide example of a highly industrialised prison labour sector, the Laogai system in China.
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Box 4: GET YOUR FACTS RIGHT
Both reports cited a figure of £9.60 as the average wage for prisoners which comes form a 2007 ’snapshot survey’. However, although the April-May 2007 survey of weekly pay for purposeful activity (work, education and training) in all 141 prisons in England and Wales, only 100 of the prisons [i] (71%) supplied useable data, amounting to 44,679 prisoners out of the April 2007 total average of 82,319 i.e. only 54% of all prisoners. More importantly, prisoners who were unemployed or in receipt of sick pay were not included in the calculations, which, if the April population total (57,036) for those 100 prisons is taken into account, means that only 78% of prisoners were employed, pushing the real average wage down to a more realistic figure of £8 per week for all prisoners, not just those engaged in purposeful activity. In addition, using the 11.8 hour working week (i.e. hours of purposeful activity) cited for 2009-10, this gives an average hourly wage of 81p, less than the PE suggested ’take home’ for ’real work’ of 70p.
"In 2009-10, approximately 98% of prisoners are on the standard or enhanced regime of incentives and earned privileges, with approximately 45,000 prisoners on the standard level and 35,000 on the enhanced level. In recent years the proportion of prisoners on the enhanced level has increased from 39% to 42%. With just 1,400 prisoners, less than 2% of prisoners, on the basic level, prison has become an increasingly comfortable environment for offenders." [PE, p.10] And follows that up with:"IEPS should be reformed so that it operates properly as a reward and not an entitlement." [PE, p.13] This fundamentally misrepresents how the IEP Scheme operates. One of the two mandatory actions of the scheme is that: "On entering custody, all prisoners must be placed initially on the standard privilege level and a review undertaken within the first month" i.e. it is the de facto neutral privilege level, and prisoners are then reassessed at regular intervals and their IEP status changed accordingly. So, less than half of all prisoners are in fact ’privileged’ and, as a fullfact.org Factcheck showed, the rate of change in numbers of Basic IEP prisoners over the past 5 years is higher than for Enhanced level prisoners (23.3% vs. 18.9%). Additionally, even on Standard IEP a prisoner is not necessarily granted all the related ’perks’, such as renting a TV or the ability to purchase a games console from private cash, that the tabloids love to lather themselves up about. [ii]
PE display a similar fundamental misunderstanding about how the prison system operates, one that is blinkered by the organisations single-minded promotion of ’the market’ as the ’be all and end all’, in arguing that Prison Industries is set up wrongly because those prisoners with no real experience of work (according to a 2003 Prison Industries Review) "should be assigned work places in prison above those who score low [on their OASys score] and therefore already have a good work ethic, some work skills and commitment to work." Prison labour has always been primarily about keeping inmates occupied, and any contribution to the internal market (i.e. keeping the costs of imprisonment down) or the external market (i.e. selling the labour value of prisoners) is incidental.
The authors of Inside Job also claim that: "Prisoners do not routinely pay income tax or NI..." [PE, p.18] and "Prisoners who work earn on average £9.60 per week – an average of less than £1 per hour – though some can earn up to £50 per week, based on their productivity and the type of work. These wages incur no deductions." [PE, p.19] Yet PSO 4460 Prisoners Pay states that:
2.8 Tax and National Insurance Thresholds
2.8.1 Prisoners earning over the normal thresholds for Income Tax and National Insurance contributions are not exempted from these payments.
2.8.2 Governors, Directors of contracted-out prisons and outside employers are legally required to deduct National Insurance contributions and income tax from the earnings of prisoners whose wages exceed the thresholds. They are also legally required to make employer’s National Insurance contributions. [my emphasis]
"[N]o inmate is compelled to work." [PE, p.14] Yet the Prison Rules 1999 states that:
31. – Work
(1) A convicted prisoner shall be required to do useful work for not more than 10 hours a day, and arrangements shall be made to allow prisoners to work, where possible, outside the cells and in association with one another.
(6) Prisoners may be paid for their work at rates approved by the Secretary of State, either generally or in relation to particular cases. [my emphasis]
Possibly the most telling faux pas in the PE document has to be the one relating to the criteria for inclusion in ’real work’ and ’time left to serve on sentence’. Having outlining the prisoner classifications [PE, p.33] and stating that "prisoners on longer sentences (four years +) who are moving towards the end of their sentence predominate in training, or Category C", it goes on to set the criteria for acceptance into Category W as "having at least two years remaining to serve on a sentence" ... "or one year in long-term scenario." Typically, Standard Determinate Sentence prisoners will serve half their sentence before being considered for release and usually will be released automatically after serving two-thirds. So, setting the criterion as "at least two years remaining to serve", rather than by the actual length of sentence as HL stipulates, is meaningless in that it could include prisoners about to be released halfway through their (4 year) sentence or (automatically) two-thirds through a 6 year sentence. [iii]
"In May 2011 the prison population in England and Wales stood at 85,136." [PE, p.14] Also incorrect. The authors are confusing the prison population, which at the time was 84,529, with the total of people held in NOMS-operated facilities, and therefore including the 607 immigration detainees held in the 4 NOMS-operated IRCs.
Last but not least we come to one of the think tank’s survey questions: "Prisons in the UK give some prisoners the opportunity to work in prison workshops, but, at present, only around 1 in 10 prisoners undertake some sort of work while they are in prison. Do you think outside employers should or should not be allowed to come into jails to run workshops and work programmes to increase the amount of work that prisoners do?" [PE, p.17] How do they justify this figure, especially when they have boasted that their grasp of such details is better than unnamed others: "The total number of work places, approximately 24,000, is considerably higher than the frequently cited figure of 9,000 work places"? [PE, p.19] Frequently cited by whom we are also forced to ask?
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